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Are banks’ below-par own debt repurchases a cause for prudential concern?
Abstract
In the lead-up to the implementation of Basel III, European banks bought back debt securities
that traded at a discount. Banks engaged in these Liability Management Exercises (LMEs) to
realize a fair value gain that the accounting and prudential rules exclude from regulatory capital
calculations, this to safeguard the safety and soundness of the banking system. For a sample
of 720 European LMEs conducted from April 2009 to December 2013, I show that banks lost
about e9.3B in premiums to compensate investors for parting from their debt securities. This
amount would have been recognized as Core Tier 1 regulatory capital, if regulation would
accept the recognition of fair value gains on debt. The premiums paid are particularly high
for the most loss absorbing capital securities. More importantly, the premiums increase with
leverage and in times of stress, right when conserving cash is paramount to preserve the safety
and soundness of the banking system. These results weaken the case of the exclusion from
regulatory capital of unrealized gains that originate from a weakened own credit standing.
JEL codes: E58, G21, G28, G32, G35, M41.
Keywords: Banking, repurchases, subordinated debt.
BANKS are subjected to a rule that requires them to derecognise, for the calculation of regulatory
capital ratios, any gains or losses on their liabilities valued at fair value that are due to changes in
their own credit standing.1 To illustrate this derecognition requirement, a bank with a low credit
rating may notice one of its debt securities trades below par and therefore may wish to recognise the
related fair value gain as income. The income increase will then directly improve the bank’s equity
level and its Core Tier 1 ratio. Unfortunately, for prudential reasons, bank solvency rules disallow
the recognition of this gain.2 However, a bank can circumvent the derecognition requirement by
repurchasing the debt security at the lower market value in a Liability Management Exercise. That
is, at a cost: To compensate the debt holder for parting from his security, a bank will have to pay a
buyback premium. This buyback premium is the subject of this study.
A typical Liability Management Exercise would work as follows: On April 1st of 2009, Cre´dit
Agricole announced the buyback of an Upper Tier 2 debt capital security that traded significantly
below par, at 52%. Shortly after the announcement, Cre´dit Agricole exchanged £545M of this
security at a price of 72%, thus paying the holders a 20% buyback premium (Cre´dit Agricole,
2011b,a). This Liability Management Exercise added £153M to equity and Core Tier 1 capital,
equivalent to a 5.03 basis points increase in Cre´dit Agricole’s 8% Core Tier 1 capital ratio. Offset-
ting this gain is the reduction of total regulatory capital by £545M, the decrease in Tier 2 capital.
In addition, at the expense of equity, Cre´dit Agricole paid the debt security holders a cash premium
of £114M (20% of £545M). In the absence of the derecognition requirement, this premium could
have been recognised as net income, which would increase common equity and Core Tier 1 capital.
The illustration demonstrates the derecognition requirement prompts inefficient behaviour:
Banks pay significant premiums to debt holders to complete a transaction that i) reduces the total
amount of and regulatory capital, ii) reduces liquidity, iii) benefits debt holders at the expense of
equity holders. This in exchange for a limited increase in Core Tier 1 capital.
1Article 64(4) of (EC, 2006))
2The rule that excludes gains and losses resulting from changes in own creditworthiness is symmetrical. Unrealized
gains originating from a deteriorated own credit standing shall not be included in regulatory capital. Likewise, the loss
on a debt security associated with an improved credit standing shall not affect regulatory capital either. This rule aligns
the measurement of liabilities with that of liabilities accounted for at amortised cost.
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There are several reasons to derecognise unrealized gains and losses on changes in own credit
standing. First is that the value of liabilities may be only temporarily depressed. This renders the
unrealized gain into a temporary one. It would therefore be imprudent for a bank to consider the
gain as realised, as that would allow a bank to distribute the gain to shareholders. This instead of
preserving it for the redemption of the liability in full.
A second reason, related to financial stability, is that a bank supervisor that allows a bank to
recognise the gain made on a deteriorated credit standing may send out a distressing signal: The
supervisor may give the impression that it acknowledges that the bank is unable to redeem the
liability in full.
A third, and often cited reason, is that gains made on a deteriorated own credit standing are
counter-intuitive (ECB, 2001; Barth et al., 2008; Alloway, 2009).
The merits of these reasons are unclear. Excluding the gains on a weakened own credit standing
because they are only temporary assumes perfect foresight about the bank’s ability to regain a
higher credit standing. Then still, by the time the bank’s credit standing improves, the assets of the
bank have increased in value more than sufficiently to enable the bank to redeem the debt in full, a
point made by Barth et al. (2008). In case the credit standing does not increase, a bank should be
able to redeem it at the lower value.3
Regarding the financial stability reason, when credit standing deteriorates, the supervisor’s
signal would likely be only one of the many worrying signals received by instrument holders.
Lastly, the reason that the gains shall be excluded because there is something intuitively wrong
about them speaks for itself.
Surprisingly little research has been done into the effects of the ban on recognising unrealized
gains and losses originating from changes in own credit standing. But, policies that rely on intuition
prompt closer examination. This is what this paper attempts to do.
3Henceforward, I will use the terms “security” and “instrument” interchangeably.
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This paper analyses the buyback premiums that 100 banks from 16 European countries paid
from April 2009 to December 2013. In a drive to improve the quality and quantity of regulatory
capital, these banks engaged in Liability Management Exercises with the objective to crystallise
fair value gains on debt instruments and add these gains to Core Tier 1 capital.
I document four factors that drive the buyback premium. The first factor is the loss-absorbing
capacity of the bought back instrument: Premiums are highest for Liability Management Exer-
cises that involve the most loss absorbing capital instruments. The second factor is book solvency
measured as equity over total assets. Less solvent banks pay a higher premium in a Liability Man-
agement Exercise than well-capitalised banks, a result that in line with option theory, but contrasts
with De Jong et al. (2009), who document no significant relation between premium and book
solvency. The third factor is economic uncertainty, which has not been documented before as a
determinant of buyback premiums. Lastly, the buyback premium decreases with the size of the
bank, which may be the result of several factors, among which are more intensive following by
investors and elevated levels of interest in these banks by governments.
To the best of my knowledge I am the first to document the effects of Liability Management
Exercises on the structure of regulatory bank capital. Banks appear willing to sacrifice total reg-
ulatory capital (i.e. hybrid Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital) for limited gains in Core Tier 1 regulatory
capital. This is also the first study that analyses Liability Management Exercises in a setting that
unambiguously incentivises banks to bolster Core Tier 1 capital to meet regulatory demands and
pressures from investors.
Unlike Mann and Powers (2007) and Wingler and Jud (1990), I find no significant relation
between buyback premiums and performance (measured by ROA).
I documents a positive effect of the EBA recapitalisation exercise, though the effect is barely
significant. This result contrasts with that of Me´sonnier and Monks (2014), who document a
negative impact of the EBA recapitalisation exercise on bank lending, which too is a manifestation
of the pressure put on banks to increase capital levels.
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These results are relevant because they show that the ban on recognising fair value gains orig-
inating from a changed own credit standing may negatively affect the safety and soundness of
the banking system. In a context of economic uncertainty, poorly capitalised banks, for which
cash conservation is paramount, engaged in the least efficient and least cash conserving Liability
Management Exercises. This is precisely the opposite of what the recognition ban aims to achieve.
I. Background – Literature and Regulation
A. Literature
There is limited literature on early debt redemptions, albeit that none of these papers study regula-
tory bank capital structure. Nor do these studies focus on change in capital structure in a context
that incentivises them to augment solvency ratios during challenging economic times. Neither has
much research been done on the exclusion from regulatory bank capital of cumulative unrealized
gains and losses on changes in own credit standing; which is surprising, because the exclusion
requirement attracted controversy at the time of the introduction of IFRS in Europe.
Early studies on Liability Management Exercises rely on small samples. For example, Johnson
et al. (1989), examine 42 in-substance defeasance transactions over the years 1980–1985. These
transactions are akin to debt securitisations, where U.S. accounting standards allowed firms to
purchase U.S. government securities to take risky debt off balance (FASB, 1983). The positive
difference between the value of the securities and the value of debt could be recognised as income
and be added to retained earnings. Johnson et al., document that debt holders benefit from these
transactions; however, they find no evidence that shareholders finance this gain. Johnson et al.
document negative stock returns around the announcement of a transaction, but this result is not
significant.
Chatterjee et al. (1995) examine the wealth effects of high-yield bond workouts of 40 dis-
tressed U.S. firms during the years 1989–1992. They document mixed evidence: exchange offers
lead to negative announcement returns, whereas tender offers lead to positive announcement re-
turns. Kruse et al. (2014) also show mixed results for announcements of debt repurchases. Returns
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around announcements of exchange offers are positive and just significant, whereas returns around
announcements of cash offers are insignificant. The strongest positive returns that Kruse et al.
document are around announcements of assets sales. But then again, that result relies on 19 ob-
servations. Moreover, untabulated results from my sample, show no difference between premiums
paid in cash buyback transactions or exchanges of instruments.
Wingler and Jud (1990) also find mixed evidence, that is, for the stock returns around the
announcement of a tender offer. They examine bond tenders of 26 U.S. utilities over the period
1983–1988 and show that investors favour an offer when a firm’s prospects are improving. For
firms with declining prospects, investors perceive tender offers as bad news. De Jong et al. (2009),
on the other hand, show no negative abnormal share returns in their study of 109 bond tender offers
by 96 European firms over the period 1996–2005.
Mann and Powers (2007) use a sample of 943 tender offers from U.S. corporates. Like Wingler
and Jud, Mann and Powers use a sample where bonds that trade at a premium dominate. Mann and
Powers show that tender offers are more likely when credit spreads are tight. My research shows
that firms engage in Liability Management Exercises in adverse conditions, e.g when spreads are
wide. In addition, Mann and Powers examine the effects of covenant restrictions. This again is
different in my study, as most of the securities exchanged are capital securities, which, to make
them more loss absorbing, have a limited number of covenants.
Regarding the accounting for debt, there is limited literature on the fair value option. This
literature focuses on firms that elected the fair value option around the time of the introduction of
SFAS No. 159 The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities in the U.S.
(FASB, 2007). In addition, this literature focuses on fair valued assets mainly, with one article
focusing on the fair value of liabilities.
Song (2008) and Henry (2008) show that firms opportunistically elect the fair value option.
Couch et al. (2014) find that SFAS No. 159 adopters have a significantly greater increase in earn-
ings volatility than non-adopters. The main cause of this result is a dominant number of firms that
adopt SFAS No. 159 for assets only, which apparently runs against the spirit of the fair value op-
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tion, as its use should mitigate the accounting mismatch between assets and liabilities by managing
them jointly.
Guthrie et al. (2011) counter the negative comments on the use of the SFAS No. 159 and find
no evidence of systematic and economically meaningful opportunistic elections of the fair value
option.
Liu et al. (2011) distinguish between initial adopters and regular adopters of SFAS No. 159,
and show that regular adopters acted according to the intent of SFAS No. 159, though some early
adopters may have acted opportunistically. Liu et al. argue that their findings for regular adopters
should apply a fortiori to all banks subsequent to initial adoption, because SFAS No. 159 is in
effect and the results of early adopters are therefore largely irrelevant.
One empirical study that investigates fair value accounting for liabilities is Barth et al. (2008)
who empirically examine the prediction of Merton (1974) on the moderating effect that debt has
on equity changes in the event of a change of own credit standing. Merton predicts that a one
dollar reduction in debt does not translate into a one dollar increase in equity. This is because the
benefits of debt reduction accrue to creditors and debt holders, not per se to equity holders. Debt
holders benefit from the improved solvency position that a debtor achieves by paying off debt.
Barth et al. empirically confirm Merton’s (1974) prediction. In addition, they find that the liability
gains on a deteriorated credit standing are more than offset by deteriorated asset values, a point
often overlooked by politicians and standard setters.
A theoretical paper that addresses buybacks is Admati et al. (2013), who argue that all of the
benefits of buying back debt accrue to debt holders, not to equity holders. Admati et al. demon-
strate that the repurchase price should make a debt holder indifferent between selling a debt in-
strument and holding on to it. This will only happen if the repurchase price equals the higher
post-buyback debt level. For highly levered firms (i.e. banks) a free-rider problem ensues, which
makes it punitively unattractive to reduce leverage. Once indebted, the cost of deleveraging only
increases, a phenomenon that Admati et al. call the “leverage ratchet effect.”
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Bulow and Rogoff (1988, 1989, 1990) present a similar reasoning, this however in the context
of the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s. Bulow and Rogoff show that debtor countries do
not benefit from buying back their lowly priced debt. All that happens in a repurchase transaction
is that the price of debt rises to the higher post-buyback level. The prospective gains of a buyback
are therefore deceptive.
B. Regulation
This section describes the relevant regulation that applies to debt instruments and their repurchase.
It describes the solvency and accounting rules that were in effect during the period that led up to the
entry into force of the EU Capital requirements regulation (CRR), the European implementation of
Basel III. It includes a brief description of the relevant European capital requirement rules as well
as applicable guidelines and standards from the European Banking Authority (EBA). Regarding
the accounting for debt instruments, I will briefly describe the IFRS rules on the fair value option
(EC, 2002).
The description of the regulation shows that from April 2009 on, European regulators actively
managed their expectations regarding the quantity and quality of regulatory bank capital. This led
to an increased demand for Core Tier 1 capital. The description also shows that banks could not
always rely on the accounting to augment capital ratios.
EU capital requirements and bank capital structure
Until the entry into force of the European implementation of Basel III in 2014, banks were sub-
jected to the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD II: EC (2006)). This directive reflects the (first)
Basel accord and the Basel II Framework, which require that 8% of risk-weighted assets be backed
by capital to absorb losses (Basel I: BCBS (1988), Basel II: BCBS (2006a)).
CRD II allowed banks to structure regulatory capital to minimize the use of costly equity. The
8% requirement for capital adequacy, for example, pertains to the BIS ratio for total capital. This
ratio is the sum of Tier 1 capital (core capital) and Tier 2 capital (or supplementary capital) both
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divided by risk-weighted assets. Banks could satisfy the total capital requirement with a maximum
of 50% Tier 2 capital, where Tier 2 capital instruments are subordinated debt instruments. See
table Table I for an overview of regulatory capital requirements.
[About here Table I]
For Tier 1 capital requirements, banks could rely on hybrid capital, e.g. preferred shares and
perpetual or permanent debt instruments that were subordinated to Tier 2 instruments. They could
use hybrid capital instruments to a maximum of 50% of capital of the highest quality (book equity).
Total Tier 1 capital then would allow up to one third of hybrid capital, with equity covering the
remaining two thirds, see Article 66(1) of CRD II. Given these limits, banks could, in theory,
satisfy the 8% regulatory capital requirements with 223% of equity over risk-weighted assets.
As a response to the global financial crisis, and to the capital standards that were in effect at
the time, bank regulators vouched to improve the quality and quantity of regulatory capital. In
particular, they responded to the April G20 of 2009, where global leaders agreed to improve the
quality, quantity, and the international consistency of capital in the banking system (G20, 2009).4
The quality of capital: Soon after the April 2009 G20, EBA’s predecessor (CEBS) published two
sets of guidelines for Tier 1 capital that initiated the drive for more and better regulatory capital.
The first set of guidelines required hybrid instruments to absorb losses through conversion or write-
down at the behest of the supervisor if the issuer of these instruments failed to do so (CEBS, 2009).
The second set of guidelines tightened the requirements for equity instruments, also known as
Core Tier 1, or core capital of the highest quality (CEBS, 2010). The reason for this tightening was
the broad definition of this element of core capital under the CRD II, which created a proliferation
of certificates and pseudo-shares that could count as core capital of the highest quality. CEBS
4This is just weeks after the meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, who showed
more restraint in their commitment to reform and strengthen the global financial system, they wanted to keep capital
requirements “unchanged until recovery is assured.” (GHOS, 2009)
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aligned the new definition of Core Tier 1 in line with the then forthcoming definition of regulatory
bank capital of Basel III (BCBS, 2009, 2010).
When Basel III came out in 2010, it presented an improved regulatory capital framework. The
structure of regulatory capital that it required had kept the two tiers (BCBS, 2010). But, it aug-
mented the importance of Common Equity Tier 1. This (CET1) is equity capital after deduction
of non-loss absorbing capital elements such as goodwill and deferred tax assets. Basel III requires
banks to hold at minimum 4.5% of CET1 over risk-weighted assets, plus 2.5% capital in a capital
conservation buffer. To mitigate procyclicality in the financial sector, Basel III requires a coun-
tercyclical buffer that would raise the capital requirements by again 2.5%. On top of these CET1
requirements is a capital surcharge for systematically important banks which requires them to have
in issue an additional 1% to 3.5% of CET1 capital.
Note that CET 1 is the Basel III definition of core capital of the highest quality, where Basel II
and implementations thereof do not define an equivalent of this element of capital. Instead, refer-
ence is made to Core Tier 1. This is Tier 1 capital net of hybrid Tier 1 instruments.
Regarding hybrid instruments, Basel III requires banks to have at least 1.5% Additional Tier 1
capital and at least 2% Tier 2 capital. Furthermore, Basel III and the EU bank recovery and
resolution directive require all capital instruments to be written off or converted into equity at the
point that the viability of the bank is at risk ((BCBS, 2011), EC (2014)).
Banks were not forced to issue Basel III compliant instruments to replace existing capital in-
struments before the entry into force of Basel III. Old-style instruments would be gradually phased
out between 1 January 2014 and 1 January 2021 (EC, 2013).
Although Basel III would only enter into force in 2014, banks responded to the regulatory ini-
tiatives by issuing instruments that anticipated the upcoming requirements. They did not, however,
issue lots of common equity. For example, in 2011, Rabobank issued a Basel III compliant Ad-
ditional Tier 1 hybrid instrument (Glover, 2011). Barclays, in 2012, announced the issuance of
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an Additional Tier 1 instrument with a trigger that would automatically write down the instrument
once the bank’s CET1 ratio would drop below 7% (Glover, 2012).
The quantity of capital: The EBA actively managed expectations with respect to the amounts
of capital that banks were expected to report. For example, for the 2011 stress test, the EBA set a
Core Tier 1 requirement at 5% of risk-weighted assets. After this stress test, EBA rapidly raised
expectations by setting that ratio to 9% for the 2012 EBA recapitalisation exercise (EBA, 2012).
In setting this high ratio requirement, EBA may have responded to the embarrassing 2011 stress
test, which did not prevent some banks from failing shortly after the results were published (Pignal
and Jenkins, 2011).
For the 2014 EU-wide stress test, the benchmark is set at 8% Common Equity Tier 1 using the
tighter definition of capital of fully implemented Basel III (ECB, 2013).
The changes in the regulation show that even before the entry into force of the CRR, regulators
actively managed expectations about the quality and quantity of regulatory capital of European
banks. Many European banks anticipated the forthcoming rules, if not voluntarily, they did so
under pressure of their supervisors, the market – or to meet requirements of stress tests and the
EBA recapitalisation exercise. In particular the EBA recapitalisation exercise stood out, because
of the short time that it granted banks to meet a fairly demanding capital requirement (Me´sonnier
and Monks, 2014).
Instead of issuing new shares to satisfy the elevated Core Tier 1 ratio requirements banks could
augment their capital of the highest quality through three alternative routes i) not distributing prof-
its, ii) selling assets with a high risk weight by way of “derisking”, and iii) buying back debt with
a low market value.
Rules on Liability Management Exercises: The quality of capital instruments relies primarily
on their loss absorbing capacity. Banks should be able to impose losses on these instruments, e.g.
through a write-down or a conversion into equity. In addition, banks can impose losses on capital
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instruments by way of cancelling coupon payments on Tier 1 instruments or postponing coupon
payments (Upper Tier 2). See Table I for an overview of the requirements for regulatory capital.
The loss absorbing capacity increases with maturity. However, bank regulation governing the
maturity of capital instruments is ambiguous and somewhat inconsistent.
In principle, regulatory capital instruments should be perpetual (or undated) and not callable.
This to make sure the instruments are permanently available to absorb losses. In addition, solvency
regulation disallows banks from creating any expectations that the instrument will be bought back
(EC, 2006; CEBS, 2009; BCBS, 2010; EC, 2013).
Tier 1 hybrid instruments should be perpetual or undated. Further, Basel II and CRD II de-
fine Upper Tier 2 capital instruments: subordinated debt instruments that should be perpetual or
undated as well. Lower Tier 2 capital instruments should be dated, with the condition that their
maturity be at least five years, with an additional requirement that their contribution to regula-
tory capital gradually declines during the five years before redemption. In practice, Lower Tier 2
therefore often have a maturity of ten years.
These maturity requirements apply only in principle: the regulation also allows banks to call
capital instruments after five years, which European banks generally do, albeit that rules apply. For
example, banks cannot call, repurchase, or redeem capital instruments during the first five years
after the date of issue (Article 64(2) of CRD II: EC (2006)). After the first five years, calls, buy-
backs, and redemptions can be executed. Still, conditions apply, where CRD II imposes conditions
that are stricter for Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 instruments than for Lower Tier 2 instruments. For
example, Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 instruments can only be called with permission of the supervisor
and if the solvency of the credit institution in question is not unduly affected (See Article 64(3) of
CRD II and §49 of CEBS (2009)). Only sufficiently solvent banks are allowed to buy back capital
instruments; albeit that well-capitalised banks have no obvious incentive to engage in Liability
Management Exercises to boost Core Tier 1 capital.
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European banks tend to call at the first call date, with Deutsche Bank being the notable excep-
tion. During the global financial crisis it did not honour the call for a Tier 2 instrument, after which
this bank found it difficult and costly to access the market for new issuances of capital instruments.
Note that the requirement to wait five years before the execution of a buyback, redemption, or
calls was violated, albeit exceptionally. For example, in November 2011, the French Autorite´ de
Controˆle Prudentiel allowed Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale, “to further enhance the quality and efficiency of the
Groups regulatory capital,” to buy back a small dozen of Tier 1 hybrids, of which at least seven
were issued less than five years earlier.
Note that Basel III and implementations thereof continue to allow calling capital instruments
after five years.
International Financial Reporting Standards
The default treatment for liabilities under IFRS is to recognise them at fair value initially, and
subsequently at amortized cost using the effective interest method (IAS 39 §47 and IFRS 9 Sec-
tion 4.2.1). This treatment applies to all instruments that cannot be measured at fair value with all
gains and losses being recognised in profit or loss, i.e. financial liabilities held for trading, deriva-
tives, and financial liabilities designated as at fair value through profit or loss on initial recognition.
Firms may designate instruments as at fair value through profit or loss on initial recognition
by way of the fair value option. Under IAS 39 and IFRS 9, firms can apply the fair value option
under conditions. For example, application of fair value option should result in more relevant
information. In addition, firms may only elect the fair value option for instruments that mitigate the
accounting mismatch that would otherwise arise from measuring assets or liabilities or recognising
the gains and losses on them on different bases (IAS 39 §9). An important additional condition
requires the firms to manage the instruments on a fair value basis (ibid). This implies that firms
should be able to trade these instruments on a daily basis, which may not dovetail with prudential
rules that require instruments to be permanently available to absorb losses.
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The use of the fair value option by banks is not unproblematic. Bank regulators, in particular
if they rely on the tight IFRS conditions, may resist its use for prudential concerns, albeit that no
regulator offers a detailed explanation supporting these worries. For example, in 2004, ahead of
the implementation of IFRS, the Basel committee issued a press release in which it expressed its
worries about the inclusion of gains and losses arising from changes in an institutions own credit
risk in regulatory capital (BCBS, 2004). The view of the committee was that these gains and
losses should be excluded from regulatory capital. Apart from a reference to prudential concerns,
the Basel committee provides no further detailed explanation or motivation supporting the ban on
recognising fair value gains on debt instruments.
The European Central Bank (ECB) also used its influence to tightly control the fair value op-
tion. For example, on 6 September 2004 , Jean-Claude Trichet, head of the ECB, wrote a comment
letter to Sir David Tweedie, chairman of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB),
informing him about additional conditions the ECB demanded with respect to the application of
fair value option.5
The lack of agreement on the IFRS standard for financial instruments (IAS 39) was not solved
at the entry into force of IFRS in Europe on 1 January 2005. Europe had endorsed IAS 39 with
the exception of two “carve-outs.” Of which one related to provisions governing the use of the
fair value option.6 Agreement on the application of the fair value option was only reached after
coordination between the European Commission, the ECB, the IASB, and the Basel Committee: In
June 2005, the carve-out was retroactively eliminated from IFRS so that companies would be able
to apply the amended (stricter) fair value option for their 2005 financial statements (EC, 2005).
The elimination of the carve-out did, however, not apply unconditionally to banks. From 2005
onward, European bank capital rules require the derecognition of any gains or losses on own lia-
bilities valued at fair value that are due to changes in a banks’ own credit standing (CEBS, 2004;
EC, 2006).
5See the letter: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/378 04 09 06 letter iasb signeden.pdf .
6The second carve-out pertained to provisions on hedge accounting.
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In 2006, the Basel committee adopted the IAS 39 (now IFRS 9) conditions for the use of the
fair value option. Moreover, the committee also decided that banks shall derecognise any gains
and losses from changes in own credit risk as a result of applying the fair value option to financial
liabilities. The motivation to adopt this rule is the particular concern that, if a bank applies the
option to its own debt, “it will recognise a gain and a resulting increase in its capital when its own
creditworthiness deteriorates. Such an outcome would undermine the quality of capital measures
and performance ratios” (BCBS, 2006b). The rule is now part of Basel III and the implementations
thereof in Europe and the U.S. (BCBS, 2010; EC, 2013; OCC, 2013).7
In practice, European rules on own debt limit the application of the fair value option. Moreover,
prudential bank regulation limits the ability to recognise fair value gains on debt.
II. Basis for prediction, Sample, and Research Design
A. Basis for prediction
A bank can circumvent restrictions on recognising fair value gains on debt and the conditions
governing the use of fair value option by repurchasing debt. In doing so, the overall debt value
increases. Therefore, an investor who is willing to sell a debt instrument back to the bank faces a
free-rider problem: other debt holders benefit from the investor’s willingness to sell his instrument
back to the bank. Consequently, the investor will not sell at the current instrument price. Instead, he
will only participate in a buyback transaction if he receives a premium. Bulow and Rogoff (1988)
and Admati et al. (2013) predict that the investor will only participate in a buyback transaction if
he receives a premium that increases the price to the value after the buyback.
7The United States followed suit, it introduced an equivalent rule in 2007 (FFIEC, 2007). The adoption of the
fair value option conditions by the Basel Committee expands their scope to all large internationally active banks
world-wide. However, the accounting rules in the U.S. (SFAS 159 and its successor Subtopic 825-10: Recognition
and Measurement of Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities) do not mention these conditions, nor does the U.S.
implementation of Basel III (OCC, 2013).
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Merton (1974) enables me to show why debt holders would command a premium for selling
their instrument back to a bank by demonstrating that the value of equity can be expressed as:
E = A ·N(d1)−Ke−rtN(d2) (1)
where E is the value of equity, A the asset value of the bank, K the book value of debt, r the risk
free rate, and t the duration of debt. N(d) is the probability that a standard normal random variable











The last term in Equation 1 is the value of debt: Ke−rtN(d2). This value increases with solvency,
that is, up to a point where the value of debt starts declining, as shown by the figure below.
[About here Figure 1]
Banks generally operate at high levels of leverage, where the graph shows that debt reduction (a
move along the graph to the right) leads to an increase in the value of the remaining debt. Holders
of bank debt will therefore command a premium for parting from their instrument.
The buyback premium: The buyback premium compensates the holder of the instrument for
early redemption in a Liability Management Exercise. The premium is of particular prudential
interest, as it reflects a loss of cash, at the expense of liquidity and total regulatory capital, with
limited gains in capital of the highest quality. Following the discussion on regulation in Section B,
banks may predominantly focus their Liability Management Exercise efforts on debt instruments
that count towards regulatory capital. The accounting rules and prudential regulation jointly work
in such a way that, irrespective of the way they accounted for, gains on these instruments can be
crystallised only through a buyback. In addition, regulatory capital instruments are meant to be
loss absorbing and therefore offer the largest potential fair value gain in a buyback transaction.
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Given Equation 1, Admati et al. (2013), and Bulow and Rogoff (1988, 1989, 1990), holders of
debt instruments will command a buyback premium:
pi = PX −PA ≥ 0




where PX is the exchange price paid for the bought back instrument, PA is its fair value before the
buyback announcement, and n is the number of outstanding debt instruments.
Firstly, I predict Tier 1 instruments and Upper Tier 2 instruments to show a larger potential fair
value gain and buyback premium than Lower Tier 2 instruments or senior unsecured debt. This is
because Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 instruments are subjected to requirements that make them more
loss absorbing than other instruments, see also Table I.
Secondly, I predict that the buyback premium inversely varies with solvency. My primary
measure of solvency relies on accounting values.
However, solvency may manifest itself in different ways. For example, a different measure of
solvency is regulatory solvency, which is the distance of a capital ratio to its minimum required
value. Unfortunately, this distance cannot be known precisely, as regulators can impose on banks
additional capital requirements unknown to the public.8 An imprecise measure of regulatory sol-
vency can be used though: a bank may signal its true regulatory solvency position by way of its
response to a stress test announcement or a call for recapitalisation.
Again another measure of solvency may be based on the probability of default, which may be
higher in times of economic stress.
8These are the Pillar 2 capital requirements, which are kept confidential and meant to cover risks other than credit
risk, market risk, and operational risk.
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B. Research Design
I use the buyback premium as my main variable of interest: This is the difference between the
buyback price and the value of the instrument before the buyback announcement.
pi = PX −PA (4)
where PX is the exchange price of the instrument expressed as a percentage of the nominal value
of the instrument; PA is the price of the instrument before the announcement, also expressed as a
percentage of the nominal value of the instrument (PN). Instruments that are bought back in a Li-
ability Management Exercise trade below par at the announcement date (PA < PN). The exchange
price should be higher, given Equation 3: PX > PA.
Regression models: To test the association between the buyback premium and loss absorbing
capacity, I initially use the following regression model:
pi = β0 +β1Tier 1+β2Upper Tier 2+β3Lower Tier 2+ ε (5)
where Tier 1 is an indicator variable that is set to 1 if the bought back instrument counted towards
Tier 1 capital, else the value is zero. Likewise, Upper Tier 2 is an indicator variable for a Upper
Tier 2 instrument, where Table I shows the loss absorbing capacity of these items. The regres-
sion model relies on p-values that account for the two dimensions (banks, time) of within-cluster
correlation (Petersen, 2009).
The second model analyses the buyback premium further; it adds control variables:





where Solvency is accounting equity divided by total assets. Size is the natural log of total assets
in millions of euros (e). GIPS is an indicator for Liability Management Exercises from banks in
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. EBA Recap is an indicator for observations of repurchases
that took place in the last two months of 2011 and the first quarter of 2012. VIX is the closing
value of the CBOE Volatility Index, standardized to values between zero and one. Frequency is
the number of Liability Management Exercises in a calender week, ROA is net income over total
assets, a measure of profitability, and AQ is the asset quality of the bank, measured as the loan loss
provision over the amount of net loans. The regression model relies on p-values that account for
the two dimensions (banks, time) of within-cluster correlation (Petersen, 2009).
I rely on various measures to control for solvency. The first is the ratio of equity over total
assets. I expect the coefficient on this measure to be negative.
As a second measure, I include size, with small banks more at risk of failing than large banks
(Banz, 1981; Fama and French, 1992) Alternatively, large banks may be too big to fail or subjected
to greater market discipline, which may affect premiums (Bhagat et al., 2012; Bertay et al., 2013).
I use an indicator variable to control for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain (GIPS). These
countries were singled out as risky debtor countries in the years after 2009, and therefore poten-
tially less able to guarantee their national banks. This implies an expected positive coefficient on
this indicator variable.
It may be that the EBA recapitalisation exercise exerted undue pressure on banks to satisfy a 9%
Core Tier 1 solvency requirement in a relatively short time. For example, Me´sonnier and Monks
(2014) offer evidence of EU banks responding to the EBA recapitalisation exercise by lending less.
Banks that were thinly capitalised may have signalled their weak regulatory capital position
by responding to this exercise through a Liability Management Exercise. Therefore, I include an
indicator variable for Liability Management Exercises announced from November 2011, right after
the announcement of the EBA recapitalisation exercise, to the end of March of 2012, three months
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before the close of the EBA recapitalisation exercise measurement date, thus allowing for a lead
time to complete a Liability Management Exercise.
Investor fear or uncertainty may alter the prospects of bank survival. Therefore, I control for
the closing value of the CBOE Volatility Index. As an alternative measure I could use the Kansas
City Financial Stress Index (KCFSI). However, where VIX data is available on a daily basis, the
KCFSI is updated monthly, which makes it hard to relate the KCFSI to an individual Liability
Management Exercise (Hakkio and Keeton, 2009). Moreover, Bellas et al. (2010) show that the
VIX is an measure of financial stress.
I control for the frequency of buybacks, i.e. the number of Liability Management Exercises
announced in a week, as banks may want to avoid to announce a buyback if other banks are already
in the market. Lastly, I control for performance (ROA) and for asset quality (AQ), where I expect
banks that engage in Liability Management Exercises to have poorer performance and lower asset
quality.
C. Sample Selection and Data
Data on Liability Management Exercises: This study relies on hand-collected data from Eu-
ropean banks over the period April 2009 to end of 2013. The period starts from the April G20
call for capital of higher quality and quantity and ends with the entry into force of the CRR, the
implementation of this G20 call. I exclude Switzerland because this country is not bound by EU
regulation.
The reasons to study only EU banks are i) EU accounting and prudential rules control the use
of the fair value option and require derecognition of fair value gains on own credit standing; ii) the
availability and quality of data. European banks more frequently engaged in Liability Management
Exercises than U.S. banks: 720 observations from 100 EU banks versus 86 from 37 U.S. banks. In
addition, the European observations are all corroborated by the Debt Capital Market desks of three
separate investment banks, which assures the Liability Management Exercises data quality.
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The data includes all Liability Management Exercises of capital instruments. To compare these
Liability Management Exercises against other, comparable transactions, I also include Liability
Management Exercises of unsecured debt instruments. These are close to capital instruments in
ranking and subordination.
Banks announce a Liability Management Exercise generally via a press release. I use this
announcement to retrieve the instrument price three days earlier, where I rely on Bloomberg for
price information.
After completion of the exercise, a bank publishes the details: e.g. the exchange price, the
notional offered amount, the notional accepted amount. With this information and the information
from the announcement it is possible to calculate the buyback premium (pi = PX −PA), as well
as the realised fair value gain that the bank then can add to equity and Core Tier 1 capital. This
(crystallised) gain is the difference between the nominal value of the underlying exchanged and
the associated actual amount.
I measure the cost of the exercise by calculating the difference between the potential fair value
gain that a bank could realize, based on the pre-announcement price of the nominal underlying
exchanged, and the actual gain the bank realised. This cost is equal to the buyback premium
multiplied by the nominal value exchanged. The larger the buyback premium, the more the holder
of the instrument gains, the less a bank can add to Core Tier 1 capital.
Note that the use of the nominal amount exchanged and the pre-announcement price give a
conservative measure of the cost of the exercise. Bank management decides some time before the
announcement of the exercise which instruments to employ in a Liability Management Exercise,
when instrument prices are low and the potential fair value gain is high. That gain may decrease
as the announcement day approaches.
Bank data: I rely on bank accounting data from Datastream. For the years 2010–2012, I use data
from the European Banking Authority (EBA) on stress tests and the EBA recapitalisation exercise
to complement missing items. The EBA data is publicly available through its website. Hand-
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collected data further complements the EBA data for the years 2009 and 2013. Restricting hand
collection to only EBA covered banks should not lead to a loss of generalisable inferences, given
that EBA’s bank data covers 70% of the total of sample bank assets.
III. Results
A. Descriptive Statistics
Tables II and III present sample descriptives: Table II offers descriptive information of the buyback
premiums as well as data on the inefficiency of Liability Management Exercises. Table III shows
data of the exercises over time and per country. Table IV compares characteristics of banks that
engaged in Liability Management Exercises to those that did not engage in these exercises.
Table II shows the buyback premium in percent of the par value of the exchanged instrument
by regulatory classification. It shows that holders of permanent instruments, i.e. Tier 1 and Upper
Tier 2 instruments, command a higher buyback premium than holders of Lower Tier 2 instruments
and non-regulatory instruments. Untabulated statistics show that the premiums are significantly
different from zero. In addition, the differences of the premiums between regulatory classifications
are also significantly different form zero, except for the difference of the premiums paid for Tier 1
and Upper Tier 2 instruments.
[About here Table II]
The next column shows the amounts offered per instrument, which are comparable for capital
instruments, but about twice as large for unsecured debt instruments.
The upper panel also shows the potential fair value gain of the liabilities subject to a Liability
Management Exercise. For example, the average Tier 2 instrument would, in the absence of a
Liability Management Exercise, offer a 41.8% discount. However, this is deceptive: The average
realised discount is only 31.93% (41.8%-9.87%).
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The rightmost column indicates the cash transfer to debt holders from equity holders. It mea-
sures which part of the potential buyback premium accrues to debt holders. Liability Management
Exercises that involve the most loss absorbing instruments are the least cash conserving: about a
quarter of the potential fair value gain goes to the debt holders. The transfer is lower for less loss
absorbing instruments.
The lower panel shows the mean amount exchanged per instrument as well as the loss of reg-
ulatory capital per exchanged instrument (in italicised font). The amounts are smaller for capital
instruments than for unsecured debt. Note that not all instruments offered are exchanged, the
success rate is about 53%.
The column at the far right of the lower panel shows the number of instruments involved in
Liability Management Exercises. These are high for Tier 1 and for Lower Tier 2 instruments,
partly reflecting the use of these instruments by banks.9
Table III shows a breakdown of the premiums as well as the amounts involved per year and per
country.
The premiums vary by year, with 2009 (2010) reporting the highest (lowest) premiums. The
observations of 2009 may reflect lingering uncertainty during the post-Lehman collapse period
as untabulated results show a drop in premiums, from 11.9% in H1 to 8.36% in H2. The low
premiums in 2010 reflect a low number of exercises.
The potential fair value gain of the Liability Management Exercises reaches a total of e42.5B.
This is significant and would contribute to improving the capital positions of EU banks.
The upper panel also shows that the actual, or crystallised, gains on Liability Management
Exercises are significantly lower than the potential gain. The difference is e9.3B, which is about
9It is impossible under Basel II rules to assess details of capital instruments that any bank has in issue. Data kept by
data vendors on regulatory capital instruments is often incomplete, banks are not required to disclose this information.
Basel III, however, does require elaborate disclosure of capital instruments, including their characteristics (BCBS,
2012).
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22% of the potential fair value gain. In the absence of the derecognition rule, this amount could
have been added to Core Tier 1 equity.
To put these amounts in perspective, EBA’s June 2013 projected CET1 shortfall of EU banks
under full implementation of Basel III was e65.4B (EBA, 2014).10 The cost of the Liability
Management Exercises (e9.3B) is therefore about 14% of this projected CET1 shortfall.
[About here Table III]
The upper panel shows that 2011 and 2012, the years of the controversial EBA stress test and
the EBA recapitalisation exercise, banks executed more Liability Management Exercises than in
other years. In these two years, banks offered a total nominal amount of e171B. In the other years,
banks offered half that amount.
The effect of the Liability Management Exercises on total EU regulatory capital is a reduction
of e117bn, with the largest reductions taking place in 2011 and 2012. The number of banks
engaging in Liability Management Exercises is also high for these two years: 37 (2011) and 48
(2012), where in other years this number ranged from 12 to 26.
Lastly, the penultimate row of the upper panel shows that the number Liability Management
Exercises dropped in 2013. The mean premium value for this year is high because of Eurobank
of Greece. Excluding this bank would lead the mean premium value to drop to 3%, which helps
explain the drop off in activity for 2013: The gains to be made in a Liability Management Exercise
dropped.
The next panel shows the transactions per country. France, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and the UK
were particularly active regarding Liability Management Exercises. The countries with the low-
est efficiency were Portugal and Spain, with Spanish banks transferring 47.5% of the potential
10This is the amount the EBA Basel III monitoring report of March 2014 mentions as the CET1 shortfall under the
assumption of fully implemented Basel III, with a CET1 ratio requirement of 7%, i.e. the CET1 ratio includes the
capital conservation buffer.
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fair value gains to debt instrument holders. Cyprus and Ireland show a low discrepancy between
potential and actual gain as banks in these countries imposed losses on debt holders.
Table IV shows descriptives of the buyback premium and sample characteristics split by banks
that did (did not) engage in Liability Management Exercises during the sample period. The table
reports 281 bank-year observations with, and 538 bank-year observations without Liability Man-
agement Exercises.
[About here Table IV]
The first row shows the distribution of the buyback premium. The average premium is relatively
high when compared to other research. De Jong et al. (2009), for a wide sample of EU banks before
the global financial crisis, for example, report an average (median) premium of 3.9% (1.2%). Mann
and Powers (2007) report average (median) premiums of 5.55% (3.24%).
The next rows of the table show that banks that engaged in Liability Management Exercises
score poorly on many dimensions. Return on Assets (ROA) and operating performance are sig-
nificantly weaker for banks that engaged in Liability Management Exercises than for the other
banks.
Measures of resilience are also weak for banks that engaged in Liability Management Ex-
ercises. Solvency, asset quality measure by way of non-performing loans over total loans, and
regulatory capital ratios are weak across the board.
The market to book value of firms that bought back liabilities is also weak. This indicating
higher levels of risk or lower growth expectations.
Risk, measured by the ratio of risk-weighted assets over total assets is also high for banks
executing Liability Management Exercises, albeit just (p-value of 0.06).
In addition, the banks that did not engage in Liability Management Exercises are relatively
small, with size measured in equity and total assets.
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The last three rows show that size the magnitude of the Liability Management Exercises. Their
effect is relatively limited, with the average cost of a Liability Management Exercise of 6 bp of
total assets. However, multiplying this number by the average equity to total asset ratio of 22.3
would indicate a loss of equity and Core Tier 1 of 1.34%.
B. Regression Results
Table V presents the results of the regression models. The dependent variable is the buyback
premium, defined as the difference between the exchange price and the instrument price three days
before the buyback announcement. The buyback premium is expressed in percent of the nominal
underlying value.
The sample data contains only transactions where the exchanged instrument is a regulatory
capital instrument or an unsecured debt instrument. Therefore, the regressors of the first regression
are only indicator variables. The coefficient values are therefore relative to those of unsecured debt
instruments. Note that the sample is smaller than the sample used for Table II; this is because of
the limited availability of data for some variables.
[About here Table V]
The first column pair shows that the coefficients on all bought back instruments are positive and
significant, which confirms that investors command a premium for redeeming debt instruments.
These coefficients are economically significant as well: the premium commanded for redeeming
a Tier 1 instrument over an unsecured instrument is 8.60%. This premium is 7.56% for an Upper
Tier 2 instrument, and 2.24% for a Lower Tier 2 instrument.
The second set of columns confirms a negative relation between the premiums commanded
and solvency measured as the ratio of equity over total assets. This coefficient remains negative
and significant throughout. This coefficient indicates that a drop of the solvency ratio by 1% point
increases the buyback premium by about 90 bp.
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The next block of regression models includes controls for size; whether the transactions were
performed by the countries with low sovereign credit quality (GIPS); the EBA recapitalisation
exercise; and the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX).
The coefficient on size is consistently negative: Larger banks pay a lower premium, a result
that supports the idea that big banks are subjected to more intensive market discipline or enjoy
support that prevents them from failing. The inclusion of size renders the coefficient on Lower
Tier 2 insignificant. The coefficients on Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 instruments remain, as expected,
positive and significant.
The coefficient on GIPS is positive as expected, indicating that banks in these countries paid
a higher premium, though the magnitude of the coefficient is about half of that of the coefficients
on Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2. However, the coefficient is insignificant throughout. Likewise, the
coefficient on EBA recapitalisation exercise is negative throughout, which is unexpected. But then
again, this coefficient is not significant.
The premiums are sensitive to the VIX. This index has the potential to increase the premium
up by 10%, which is statistically and economically significant.
The last block with coefficient values shows that the controls for issue frequency, performance,
and asset quality have the predicted values. However, none of these coefficients are significant.
The results of Table II and Table V confirm my expectations. The premiums paid in Liability
Management Exercises i) increase with the loss absorbing capacity of bought back instruments,
ii) decrease with solvency measured by the ratio of equity over total assets, and iii) increase with




The regression results reported in Table V do not include a measure of risk. As risk may augment
the buyback premium, I included the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets as a measure of
risk in the regression model below:




For the risk-weighted assets, I rely data from the European Banking Authority, supplemented
by hand collected data. The bank coverage of the EBA leads to a smaller number of observations.
Table VI reports the results that include risk as a regressor. It shows that risk affects the buyback
premium, however this goes at the expense of the significance of the size variable, albeit slightly.
This trade-off between risk an size has been documented by Bhagat et al. (2012).
In any case, the coefficients on Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 capital instruments, solvency, and VIX
remain statistically and economically significant.
Cumulative abnormal announcement returns
I mainly focus on the buyback premium because of its prudential relevance: the premium is a
transfer of cash from the owners of the bank to its debt holders, which weakens a bank’s resilience.
Although Admati et al. (2013) and Bulow and Rogoff (1988) claim that the benefits of deleveraging
predominantly accrue to the debt holders, the Liability Management Exercises that are the subject
of this study are executed under pressure of investors, among which are equity investors. Therefore,
and because of Merton (1974), equity investors should respond favourably to the announcement of
a Liability Management Exercise. But, it is unclear what to expect in terms of significance: Most
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of the Liability Management Exercises involve regulatory capital, which by definition is a limited
fraction of the total assets of the bank.
More importantly, even if investors were to welcome a Liability Management Exercise, beware
that banks engage in these exercises to circumvent the ban on derecognising fair value gains on debt
instruments. The results may therefore be weaker compared to the fictional situation that allowed
banks to recognise fair value gains on debt as capital without executing a Liability Management
Exercise.
Table VII reports cumulative returns around Liability Management Exercises announcements
of 42 banks over the sample period. The abnormal returns rely on the market model, estimated
over days -250 to -50 before the announcement.
[About here Table VII]
The results confirm the direction of my expectations, investors welcome a Liability Manage-
ment Exercise announcement by 2.03%, that is, for the announcement windows starting at day -3.
With p-values of 5% and 6%, these results are just significant. The results show that investors
appear to regard news received at the day of the Liability Management Exercise announcement as
good news. These inferences should be drawn with care as the number of observations is limited
to only 98.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Bank solvency rules disallow banks from recognising unrealized gains and losses that are the result
of changes in the fair value of liabilities that originate from changes in their own credit standing.
This to safeguard the safety and soundness of the banking system. As a consequence of this
derecognition requirement, banks that may want to realize a fair value gain on liabilities can do so
by repurchasing them from their holders in a Liability Management Exercise (LME).
The results of this paper show that Liability Management Exercises may not contribute to
the safety and soundness of the banking system: Banks pay significant premiums to buy back
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debt. These premiums go at the expense of banks’ liquidity and banks’ overall regulatory solvency
position. For example, the majority of exercises involved Tier 2 securities, debt instruments that
count as regulatory bank capital and contribute to the BIS ratio. These instruments are bought
back, after which the gain, net of the buyback premium, is added to Core Tier 1 capital. The total
buyback premium that the sample banks paid amounts to e9.3B, this out of a potential fair value
gain ofe42.5B that banks could recognise in full and add to Core Tier 1 capital if the rules allowed
them to do so. The overall reduction in total regulatory of e117B is only offset by an increase of
e33B in Core Tier 1 capital.
In addition, Liability Management Exercises that involve the most loss absorbing regulatory
capital instruments command a significantly higher premium than instruments that are less loss
absorbing: the buyback premium for Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 instruments is about 500 bp higher
than the premium paid for less loss absorbing Lower Tier 2 instruments.
The results show also that buyback premiums increase with leverage and decrease with size:
Weaker and smaller banks pay higher premiums. Moreover, the premiums paid in Liability Man-
agement Exercises are high in times of economy-wide stress.
These results may have policy implications: contrary to the objectives of bank solvency rules,
the ban on recognising fair value gains on debt instruments may not help the safety and soundness
of the banking system. In a context of economic uncertainty, poorly capitalised banks, for which
cash conservation is paramount, engaged in the least efficient and least cash conserving Liability
Management Exercises. Precisely opposite to what the recognition ban aims to achieve.
My results therefore weaken the case of the exclusion of unrealized gains and losses that orig-
inate from changes in own credit standing.
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Figure 1: the value of debt: The graph follows








, A is total assets, K the book value of
debt, r the risk free rate, and t the duration of debt. N(d) is
the probability that a standard normal random variable will
be less than or equal to d. The figure assumes the follow-
ing parameter values: t is 2.5 year – assuming on a average
maturity of a 5 year Tier 2 hybrid capital security. The risk-
free rate: r = 4.0%, annual standard deviation σ= 20.0%.
36
Table I
Capital and loss absorbing capacity.
The table below outlines the loss absorbing capacity of capital instruments, with the most loss absorbing items at the top. The descriptions follow
abridged capital definitions of Basel II (BCBS, 2006a), CRD II (EC, 2006) and Basel III (BCBS, 2010), CRR (EC, 2013). CRR, Europe’s Basel III
implementation entered into force on 1st of January, 2014. Tier 1 hybrid and Additional Tier 1 instruments are senior in ranking to common stock
and rank junior to depositors, general creditors and subordinated debt of the bank. Upper Tier 2 instruments are undated, permanent, instruments
that are subordinated in full to non-subordinated creditors. Lower Tier 2 instruments are dated instruments of which the principal is subordinated
to non-subordinated creditors. Tier 2 (Basel III) instruments are subordinated to depositors and general creditors of the bank. RWA is risk-weighted
assets.
Basel II and CRD II Item Maturity Remarks Requirement
Capital of Highest Quality (book
equity)







Tier 1 + Tier 2 ≤8%
of RWA
> 23 of Tier 1 ⇐
Subordination
Hybrid instruments1 Tier 1 Hybrids Permanent, perpet-
ual, preferential.
Subordinated to
Tier 2. Coupon may
be cancelled.
≤ 13 of Tier 1




Tier 2 ≤ Tier 1
Subordinated debt instruments1 Lower Tier 2 Maturity ≥ 5 years





Basel III and CRR









≥ 4.5% + buffers up
to 8.5% of RWA.
⇐
Subordination





Tier 2. Coupon may
be cancelled.
≥ 1.5% of RWA
Subordinated debt instruments1,2 Tier 2 Maturity ≥ 5 years. ≥ 2% of RWA
1These instruments are callable at the initiative of the issuer after a minimum of five years. Except for Lower Tier 2 instruments, calls and
buybacks i) need supervisory approval, ii) are allowed if the financial and solvency conditions of the institution are not unduly affected.
2 Under Basel III rules and under the EU bank recovery and resolution directive, all instruments shall be written off or converted into equity at the
point that the viability of the bank is at risk (BCBS (2011), EC (2014)).
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Table II
European Liability Management Exercises 2009–2013, exchanged instruments.
The table below shows descriptive statistics of 720 European Liability Management Exercises over the period April 2009–December
2013. pi is the mean buyback premium: PX −PA, where PX is the exchange price of the instrument expressed as a percentage of the
nominal value of the instrument; PA is the price of the instrument before the announcement, also expressed in a percentage of the nominal
value of the instrument (PN). Offered is the mean amount the bank announces in the Liability Management Exercise, in millions of e.
Potential Gain is the mean potential fair value gain that a bank could realize in a Liability Management Exercise, based on the pre-
announcement price of the nominal amount exchanged. Inefficiency is the ratio of Cost over Potential Gain. Exchanged is the mean
nominal underlying the bank bought back in the Liability Management Exercise, in millions of e. ∆Reg.Cap.: the italicised font denotes
the mean loss of total regulatory capital resulting from the Liability Management Exercise. Success rate is the mean of the ratio of
exchanged over offered. Instruments is the number of instruments exchanged. Amounts are in millions of e.
Eligibility Premium (pi) Offered(e) Potential Inefficiency (%)
Gain (%) = PremiumPotential Gain
Tier 1 11.32 373 44.9 25.2
Upper Tier 2 9.87 301 41.8 23.6
Lower Tier 2 5.59 366 28.0 20.0
Unsecured Debt 2.48 762 17.3 14.3
Aggregate 8.22 383 35.8 23.0
Eligibility Exchanged (e) Success rate (%) Instruments
∆Reg. Cap.
Tier 1 187 54.0 280
Upper Tier 2 161 53.5 97
Lower Tier 2 179 52.8 302
Unsecured Debt 392 51.0 41
Aggregate 192 53.2 720
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Table III
European Liability Management Exercises 2009–2013, years, countries.
The table below shows amounts involved in European Liability Management Exercises over the period April 2009–December 2013. pi is the mean
buyback premium: PX −PA, where PX is the exchange price of the instrument expressed as a percentage of the nominal value of the instrument; PA
is the price of the instrument before the announcement, also expressed in a percentage of the nominal value of the instrument (PN). Potential Gain
is the potential fair value gain that a bank could realize in a Liability Management Exercise, based on the pre-announcement price of the nominal
amount exchanged. The Actual Gain is the fair value gain that a bank realized in a Liability Management Exercises, based on the exchange price
of the nominal amount exchanged. Cost is the difference between Actual Gain and Potential Gain. This is a measure of the cost of the Liability
Management Exercise. Inefficiency is the ratio of Cost over Potential Gain. Offered is the amount the bank announces in the buyback offer, in
millions of e. ∆ Reg.Cap. is the change in total regulatory capital resulting from the Liability Management Exercise. Bank-Years is the number of
sample bank-year observations.
Gains and Losses per year (amounts in Millions e)
Year pi (%) Potential Gain Actual Gain Cost Inefficiency (%) Offered ∆ Reg. Cap. Bank-Years
2009 10.06 9,459 7,180 2,279 24.1 36,274 20,117 26
2010 5.23 8,901 7,806 1,095 12.3 38,696 20,925 12
2011 7.10 12,699 9,871 2,828 22.3 71,856 36,368 37
2012 9.16 10,576 7,911 2,665 25.2 99,399 35,748 48
2013 9.60 884 465 419 47.4 12,766 3,586 18
Aggregate 8.22 42,519 33,233 9,286 21.8 258,991 116,744 141
Gains and Losses per country (amounts in Millions e)
Country pi (%) Potential Gain Actual Gain Cost Inefficiency (%) Offered ∆ Reg. Cap. Bank-Years
Austria 6.63 845 699 147 17.4 4,913 2,599 6
Belgium 15.67 969 735 235 24.3 2,126 1,775 3
Cyprus 3.00 151 141 9 6.0 413 314 1
Denmark 4.69 51 46 5 9.8 675 149 2
France 6.13 4,189 3,279 909 21.7 33,194 12,147 15
Germany 8.25 1,894 1,514 380 20.1 10,049 4,774 4
Greece 20.07 1,342 953 389 29.0 5,271 2,201 8
Ireland 4.34 11,109 10,083 1,025 9.2 28,573 18,024 11
Italy 4.23 3,075 2,445 630 20.5 52,643 12,765 15
Luxembourg 3.41 31 24 6 19.4 698 188 1
Netherlands 7.45 2,397 1,664 733 30.6 13,882 8,258 8
Portugal 22.67 1,424 861 563 39.5 4,701 2,119 5
Slovenia 7.43 24 22 3 12.5 56 56 1
Spain 11.13 3,944 2,070 1,874 47.5 45,583 18,824 30
Sweden 12.33 185 132 53 28.6 975 535 1
UK 6.98 10,890 8,564 2,326 21.4 55,240 32,016 30
Aggregate 8.22 42,519 33,233 9,286 21.8 258,991 116,744 141
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Table IV
Characteristics of sample banks.
The table reports descriptive statistics, separately for European banks that did (and did not) engage in Liability Management Exercises, over the period April 2009–December 2013. Except
for the buyback premium (pi), all table entries originate from bank-years. Ever LME (Never LME) denotes banks that (did not) engage in Liability Management Exercises. The table reports
281 bank-year observations with, and 538 bank-year observations without Liability Management Exercises. p5, p25, p50, p75, p95 indicate percentile values for percentiles 5,25,75 and 95
and the median (p50). p-value indicates the significance of the differences in means. pi is the mean buyback premium: PX −PA, where PX is the exchange price of the instrument expressed
as a percentage of the nominal value of the instrument; PA is the price of the instrument before the announcement, also expressed in a percentage of the nominal value of the instrument
(PN). Net Income is the income the bank realized over the fiscal year. Operating is the ratio of net interest income divided by total assets. ROA is the net income over total assets, a measure
of profitability. Solvency is accounting equity divided by total assets. AQ is the asset quality of the bank, measured as the loan loss provision over the amount of net loans. BIS ratio is the
sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital divided by risk weighted assets. Market to Book is the market to book ratio. Tier 1 Ratio is the regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio of the bank. Risk is the ratio
of risk-weighted assets over total assets. Equity is Common Shareholders’ Equity. Total Assets is the book value of total assets at fiscal year-end. Potential Gain is the potential fair value
gain that a bank could realize in a Liability Management Exercise, based on the pre-announcement price of the nominal amount exchanged, in bp over total assets. Actual Gain is the fair
value gain that a bank realized in a Liability Management Exercises, based on the exchange price of the nominal amount exchanged, in bp over total assets. Cost is the difference between
Potential Gain and Actual Gain, in bp over total assets.
Ever LME Never LME Means
p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 Ever Never p-value
Buyback premium (pi in %) 0.06 2.29 5.06 10.28 29.19 8.22
Net Income (Me) -3,647 -429 82 638 3,581 -347 4 50 172 2,500 -24 304 0.02
ROA (%) -4.23 -0.49 0.16 0.31 0.79 -2.03 0.13 0.41 0.64 1.41 -0.57 0.10 0.00
Operating (%) 0.30 1.00 1.30 1.90 2.60 0.50 1.10 1.50 2.40 4.30 1.40 1.90 0.00
Solvency (%) 1.10 3.60 5.20 6.60 10.00 2.30 4.70 6.80 10.30 16.80 5.40 8.30 0.00
AQ (%) 0.14 0.46 0.96 1.69 4.85 0.00 0.12 0.44 1.28 3.96 1.61 1.06 0.00
BIS Ratio (%) 9.60 11.60 13.45 15.30 17.80 10.50 13.40 15.20 17.70 21.60 13.54 15.30 0.00
Market to Book 0.10 0.37 0.62 0.86 1.42 0.04 0.34 0.69 1.20 2.08 0.72 0.85 0.04
Tier 1 Ratio (%) 6.90 9.03 10.70 12.90 16.40 4.00 10.20 13.10 16.70 21.50 11.00 13.40 0.00
Risk (%) 0.24 0.34 0.50 0.60 0.83 0.18 0.25 0.36 0.51 1.36 0.49 0.44 0.06
Equity (Me) 332 1,678 6,055 16,303 59,690 28 192 1,033 2,723 27,741 14,047 5,209 0.00
Total Assets (Me) 10,157 43,972 112,963 362,083 1,549,469 304.49 2,592 13,800 53,241 689,298 312,776 118,564 0.00
Potential Gain (bp) 0 3 7 22 70 20
Actual Gain (bp) 0 1 4 15 59 15
Cost (bp) 0 1 2 5 28 6
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Table V
Buyback premiums of European Liability Management Exercises 2009–2013, regression results.
The table below reports results of a regression that relies on European Liability Management Exercises over the period April 2009–December 2013. The dependent variable is the buyback premium,
the difference between the exchange price and its price three days before the buyback announcement, expressed in percent of the nominal underlying value of the instrument.
pi = β0 +β1Tier 1+β2Upper Tier 2+β3Lower Tier 2+β4Solvency+β5Size+β6GIPS+β7EBA Recap+β8V IX +β9Frequency+β10ROA+β11AQ+ ε
Tier 1 is an indicator variable for exchanged instruments that are undated, permanent, capital instruments that are senior in ranking to common stock and always rank junior to depositors, general
creditors and subordinated debt of the bank. Upper Tier 2 is an indicator variable for exchanged instruments that are undated, permanent, instruments that are subordinated in full to non-subordinated
creditors. Lower Tier 2 is an indicator variable for exchanged instruments that are dated instruments of which the principal is subordinated to non-subordinated creditors. Solvency is accounting
equity divided by total assets. Size is the value of total assets in millions of e. GIPS is an indicator for Liability Management Exercises from Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. EBA Recap is an
indicator for observations of repurchases that took place in the last two months of 2011 and the first quarter of 2012. VIX is the closing value of the CBOE Volatility Index, standardized to values
between zero and one. Frequency is the number of Liability Management Exercises in a calender week. ROA is the net income over total assets, a measure of profitability. AQ is the asset quality of
the bank, measured as the loan loss provision over the amount of net loans. The regression model relies on p-values that account for the two dimensions (banks, time) of within-cluster correlation
(Petersen, 2009).
β p β p β p β p β p β p β p β p β p
Tier 1 8.60 0.00 6.69 0.00 7.77 0.00 7.33 0.00 7.37 0.00 6.35 0.00 7.08 0.00 7.57 0.00 7.44 0.00
Upper Tier 2 7.56 0.01 6.10 0.03 8.35 0.00 7.93 0.00 7.69 0.00 7.01 0.00 7.68 0.00 8.05 0.00 7.92 0.00
Lower Tier 2 2.24 0.13 1.10 0.27 2.11 0.11 1.46 0.19 1.54 0.16 1.18 0.21 2.05 0.11 2.36 0.10 2.24 0.08
Solvency -82.00 0.01 -94.12 0.00 -93.43 0.01 -102.23 0.00 -94.86 0.01 -96.77 0.00 -90.47 0.01 -92.32 0.01
Size -2.66 0.00 -2.35 0.00 -2.30 0.00 -2.26 0.00 -2.55 0.00 -2.34 0.00 -2.34 0.00
GIPS 2.38 0.07 2.03 0.09 2.05 0.09 2.45 0.09 2.11 0.10 1.96 0.14
EBA Recap -1.88 0.24 -2.81 0.07 -2.91 0.10 -3.05 0.10 -3.08 0.10
VIX 9.4 0.00 9.7 0.00 10.0 0.00 10.1 0.00
Frequency 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.23
ROA -39.93 0.18 -31.85 0.17
AQ 9.11 0.43
Intercept 2.65 0.00 8.53 0.00 41.8 0.00 37.3 0.00 37.8 0.00 35.2 0.00 36.7 0.00 33.3 0.00 33.39 0.00
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.07 0.10 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
# of obs. 579 579 579 579 579 579 579 579 579
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Table VI
Regression results and risk.
The table below reports results of a regression that relies on European Liability Management Exercises over Equitythe period April 2009–December
2013. The dependent variable is the buyback premium, the difference between the exchange price and its price three days before the buyback
announcement, expressed in percent of the nominal underlying value of the instrument.
pi = β0 +β1Tier 1+β2Upper Tier 2+β3Lower Tier 2+β4Solvency+β5Size+
β6GIPS+β7EBA Recap+β8V IX +β9Frequency+β10Risk+β11AQ+ ε
Tier 1 is an indicator variable for exchanged instruments that are undated, permanent, capital instruments that are senior in ranking to common
stock and always rank junior to depositors, general creditors and subordinated debt of the bank. Upper Tier 2 is an indicator variable for exchanged
instruments that are undated, permanent, instruments that are subordinated in full to non-subordinated creditors. Lower Tier 2 is an indicator variable
for exchanged instruments that are dated instruments of which the principal is subordinated to non-subordinated creditors. Solvency is accounting
equity divided by total assets. Size is the value of total assets in millions of e. GIPS is an indicator for Liability Management Exercises from
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. EBA Recap is an indicator for observations of repurchases that took place in the last two months of 2011 and
the first quarter of 2012. VIX is the closing value of the CBOE Volatility Index, standardized to values between zero and one. Frequency is the
number of Liability Management Exercises in a calender week. Risk is the ratio of risk-weighted assets over total accounting assets. AQ is the asset
quality of the bank, measured as the loan loss provision over the amount of net loans. The regression model relies on p-values that account for the
two dimensions (banks, time) of within-cluster correlation (Petersen, 2009).
β p
Tier 1 4.87 0.00
Upper Tier 2 5.84 0.00










Prob > F 0.00
R2 0.22
# of obs. 481
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Table VII
Cumulative Abnormal Announcement Returns.
The table below reports cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around an announcement of a Liability Management Exercise. The sample contains
Liability Management Exercise announcements over the period April 2009–December 2013. The abnormal returns rely on the market model,
estimated over days [-250 – -50] before the announcement. All returns are from Datastream.
Cumulative Abnormal Return (%) Standard Deviation # of obs. p-value
CAR -1, 1 0.72 0.09 98 0.21
CAR -3, 2 2.03 0.13 98 0.06
CAR -3, 5 2.02 0.13 98 0.07
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